Examining the Effects of Deregulation on Retail Electricity Prices by Taber, John T. et al.
 1
  
  WP 2005-14 
 February 2006 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
Department of Applied Economics and Management 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York  14853-7801  USA 
 
 
Examining the Effects of Deregulation on Retail 
Electricity Prices 
 
 
John Taber, Duane Chapman, and 
 Tim Mount 
 2
  
It is the policy of Cornell University actively to support equality of educational 
and employment opportunity.  No person shall be denied admission to any 
educational program or activity or be denied employment on the basis of any 
legally prohibited discrimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as 
race, color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or handicap. 
The University is committed to the maintenance of affirmative action 
programs  which will assure the continuation of such equality of opportunity. 
 3
Examining the Effects of Deregulation on Retail Electricity Prices* 
Abstract 
A primary aim of deregulation is to reduce the customer cost of electricity.  In this 
paper, we examine the degree of success in reaching that goal using a variety of methods.  
We examine rates for each of four customer classes; for regulated, deregulated and 
publicly owned utilities; and for three definitions of deregulation.  We control for a 
variety of factors which may independently affect differences in electricity price: climate, 
fuel costs, and electricity generation by energy source.  Taken as a whole, the results 
from our analysis do not support a conclusion that deregulation has led to lower 
electricity rates.
                                                 
* This paper was presented July 5, 2005 at the annual meeting of the Western Economic Association 
International at the session entitled “Power Market Restructuring: A Review” and September 20, 2005 at 
the annual North American Conference of the USAEE/IAEE at the session entitled “Electricity Market 
Structure, Conduct and Performance.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued order number 888 in 
1996, many states began to initiate programs designed to allow varying degrees of 
competition among privately-owned utilities.  Briefly, there were four major components 
used to effect deregulation: the formation of Independent System Operators (ISO’s), the 
establishment of wholesale auction-based markets for electricity, retail-choice programs, 
and the breakup of vertical electricity monopolies, usually through a divestiture of the 
generating assets of transmission and distribution companies.  By encouraging 
competition, deregulation aimed to increase the efficiency of the electricity market, thus 
lowering retail electricity prices and improving the quality of service.  By 2002, over 
30% of the electricity sales (by kilowatt-hour) in the United States were occurring in 
deregulated states, serving customers in 13 states and the District of Columbia with 
almost 41% of the country’s population.  In those states, almost 80% of the power 
produced was generated by privately-owned companies (EIA, Form 861).  In this paper, 
we are concerned with investigating the success of one of the goals of deregulation: 
lowering retail energy prices.   
Deregulated markets, according to economic theory, were expected to be 
competitive, offering lower marginal costs and lower rates.  “Has Restructuring Improved 
Operating Efficiency at US Electricity Generating Plants?” (Markiewicz et al, 2004) 
looks at the changes in non-fuel operating efficiencies and employment costs at 
municipally owned plants and investor owned plants in deregulated and regulated states.  
The results show that investor-owned plants in deregulated states reduced both costs by 
about 5% relative to investor-owned plants in still regulated states and reduced labor 
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costs by 15% and non-fuel operating expenses by 20% when compared to municipal, 
federal and cooperative plants.  A similar study, “Ownership Change, Incentives and 
Plant Efficiency: The Divestiture of U.S. Electric Generation Plants” (Bushnell and 
Wolfram, 2005) shows similar results for fuel efficiency changes in deregulated plants.  
Controlling for output level, deregulated plants used 2% less fuel per MWh of electricity 
produced, averaged across different fuel types, than still-regulated plants, especially at 
high output.  “Emissions Trading, Energy Restructuring, and Investment in Pollution 
Abatement” (Fowlie, 2005) finds that deregulated utilities choose less expensive 
pollution abatement options than still regulated utilities.   
Finally, “Testing the Effects of Holding Forward Contracts On the Behavior of 
Suppliers in an Electricity Auction” (Oh and Mount, 2004) looks at the effect of different 
kinds of forward contracts and their usefulness in reducing high electricity spot prices, as 
well as the efficacy of computer agents for simulating interactions in such markets.  
Forward contracts which are held throughout the entire period offer lower prices than 
forward contracts which are periodically renewed or forward contracts purchased in an 
active trading market, which allows them to be influenced by high spot prices. 
However, other factors such as the concentration of market power, poorly 
designed energy markets, unusual climate conditions, or high fuel costs may have had an 
opposite effect, possibly resulting in ultimately higher prices.  “Market Efficiency, 
Competition, and Communication in Electric Power Markets: Experimental Results” 
(Chapman et al, 2004) looks at the minimum number of electricity producers in an 
auction market necessary to result in wholesale prices approximating a competitive level.  
Through empirical tests, the researchers tried to see if competitive prices were achieved 
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with six, 12, and 24 suppliers if no communication of any sort was allowed among 
producers.  Then, increasingly less restrictive behaviors were allowed.  Generally, if 
prices in a market are within 10% of the competitive price, the auction market is 
considered to be workably competitive.  Under the restrictive communications rules, only 
a market with 24 producers is not significantly above this benchmark (though it is 
significantly above the competitive price.)  As restrictions on communication are 
lessened, prices approach those predicted under a monopoly, even though indexes of 
competition suggest the market is competitive.  The article does not discuss what price 
level might be required to ensure sufficient investment in new capital.  It might be 
possible, for instance, to have auction prices significantly above short-run marginal costs, 
but still below levels necessary to guarantee sufficient levels of capital investment.   
“Simulating GenCo Bidding Strategies in Electricity Markets With an Agent-
Based Model” (Botterud et al, 2005) examines the issue of market power in electricity 
markets.  Specifically, by modeling the bidding strategies employed in auction-based 
electricity markets, the study finds that conventional measures used to assess market 
power, such as the HHI, prove inadequate as a measure for market concentration in the 
electric industry.  Because they fail to take into account the unique limitations of the 
electric power industry, such as transmission limitations and local load pockets, they can 
understate the degree of market power held by a given supplier.  The market power of a 
supplier can be best understood by studying the layout of the electric grid.   
“Testing the Effects of Inter-Regional Transfers of Real Energy on the 
Performance of Electricity Markets” (Mount and Thomas, 2004) looks at the results of an 
experiment designed to test the interaction of market power, transmission constraints, and 
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system reliability.  Like the previous paper, this one found that estimating market power 
and system bottlenecks to be difficult, especially because inter-regional transfers can 
result in problems with the transmission system appearing in unexpected locations.  
Furthermore, the authors contend that the reliability of the electric system is a public 
good and thus, a market system an inefficient means for control – the owners of the grid 
should continue to be regulated.  Finally, the widely-used bilateral contracts which pay 
wheeling charges across the expected flow route of the real energy are overly simplistic 
and discount the complex nature of flows across an AC network.  Contracts are allowed 
only if the do not explicitly harm reliability across a path chosen for accounting means, 
but the path taken by energy in the real word as it flows from generator to consumer 
rarely follows this accounting path.  Thus, different financial contracts such as futures 
hedging are a more effective means than physical bilateral contracts for the transfers of 
electricity and should be encouraged. 
“Cost Savings from Generation and Distribution with an Application to Italian 
Electric Utilities” (Fraquelli et al, 2004) looks at the effects of deregulation on the cost of 
generation, particularly the effect of the breakup of vertical monopolies.  By estimating 
cost functions for electric utilities in Italy, the study finds statistically significant cost 
savings resulting from vertical integration for average sized firms.  Furthermore, there is 
an element of scale to these cost savings, as large operators see cost savings as high as 
30% from vertical integration, versus savings of only 3% for small operators.  Also, firms 
in which the amount of electricity generated and distributed is equal see even higher cost 
savings.  Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that the divestiture included as a 
component of deregulation may actually lead to increasing costs. 
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Compared to the number of studies analyzing the effects of deregulation on 
wholesale prices, there have been relatively few studies that directly compare prices in 
regulated and deregulated states. “Competition Has Not Lowered US Industrial 
Electricity Prices” (Apt, 2005) examines the annual rate of change of nominal industrial 
electricity prices in restructured and regulated states.  The study found that in states 
which initiated retail competition, restructuring of the electricity industry did not lead to 
lower industrial electricity prices, or reduce the rate at which those prices increase.  Also, 
the study notes that the rate of increase of prices in deregulated states is greater after 
deregulation than before in twelve out of nineteen states.  However, the study made no 
corrections for variables such as fuel costs or generation ratios, though those are noted as 
important factors affecting electricity prices. 
Like the above paper, “Markets for Power in the United State: An Interim 
Assessment” (Joskow, 2006) primarily focuses on retail choice programs.  He argues that 
they have the potential to offer lower rates to customers.  However, due to political and 
technical issues, deregulation as a whole has not yet succeeded in its aim of providing 
reduced prices to consumers.  Although real residential rates in states with retail 
competition decreased more than in states without, real industrial prices decreased less in 
states with retail competition.  In addition, those states which had the greatest rates of 
switching providers actually saw rate increases.  Controlling for other factors leads to 
more agreement on the effects of retail competition across customer classes: prices 
decreased about 5% to 10% at the means of the sample for industrial and residential 
customers.  In recent years, many of the technical issues have been addressed (e.g. 
“seams problems”, new generation and transmission incentives), and now Joskow says 
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the largest obstacles to effective deregulation are political ones (e.g. “delays in 
implementing Order 2000 and the withdrawal of the proposed SMD rule in July 2005”). 
  Two other studies had conflicting results, though they were limited in their 
geographic scope.  “Electricity Prices in PJM: A Comparison of Wholesale Power Costs 
in the PJM Market to Indexed Generation Service Costs” (Biewald et al, 2004) examines 
wholesale power costs in the PJM market for selected companies and compared them to 
estimated generation costs under the former regulated regime.  Essentially, hypothetical 
generation costs under the regulated regime were estimated by indexing a base year 
generation cost to fuel share and fuel cost figures for three utility companies.  The study 
also acknowledges several flaws with this approach.  First, the indexed costs include 
some cost components not included in the current wholesale power costs, such as 
“stranded costs” and transmission costs.  Also, wholesale power costs may be different 
than retail power costs due to factors such as marketing costs and market power.  The 
authors also posit that wholesale power costs have also been unusually low in the PJM 
market due to a surplus of new capacity in the region.  Finally, only three companies in 
PJM were studied, and it might be possible that an analysis of other companies in the 
region would show different results.  “Putting Competitive Power Markets to the Test - 
The Benefits of Competition in America’s Electric Grid: Cost Savings and Operating 
Efficiencies” (Global Energy Decisions, 2005) looks at the benefits to customers in the 
Eastern Interconnect realized through deregulation.  Through a simulation of expected 
market prices had deregulation not occurred, Global Energy Decisions estimated that 
from 1999-2004, customers in that region saved $15.1 billion as a result of deregulation, 
attributed to increased operating efficiencies at power plants.  Changes in ownership 
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resulted in shorter refueling outages, better capacity factors and improved reliability.  
Furthermore, new territories added to the study area in 2004 realized an annualized 
savings of $85.4 million, and customers throughout the Eastern Interconnection also 
benefited, thanks to an elimination of seams in the market. 
“CERA: N.A. Restructuring Only Gets Grade of C+” (Platts, 2005) summarizes 
the initial findings of a CERA study which finds mixed results from deregulation in the 
United States.  The study claims that customers in the South and the Northeast saw 
significant savings from deregulation, mostly resulting from rate freezes and a 
competitive wholesale market, though customers in the West paid higher prices under 
deregulation than they would have under a regulated regime.  Many states that are 
implementing deregulation are still and have not yet achieved full competition. 
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II. DEFINING RETAIL ELECTRICITY PRICES USED 
To examine the effects of deregulation on retail electricity prices, we have used a 
variety of measures, including different customer classes and definitions of deregulation.  
We have included four different customer classes: average annual prices for residential, 
commercial, and industrial customers and total average annual electricity prices from 
1990-2003.  Additionally, we have separated electricity suppliers into three different 
categories: privately-owned utilities in regulated states, privately-owned utilities in 
deregulated states, and publicly-owned utilities.  For the purposes of this paper, we are 
examining three variations in a definition of deregulation.  For our primary definition, we 
consider as deregulated those utilities which belonged to an ISO with an auction-based 
market at the end of the period in 2002.  As a second definition, we consider a utility to 
be deregulated only for those years in which it actually belonged to an ISO.  Finally, we 
take a utility as deregulated only for the years it belonged to an ISO which had an 
auction-based market.  For example, the New York ISO was formed in 1998 and initiated 
energy markets in 1999.  Under the first definition, we would place privately-owned 
utilities in New York State in the deregulated category for the entire time period, because 
in 2002 it belonged to the NYISO, which had a wholesale market.  Under the second 
definition, we would only consider privately-owned utilities in New York State to be 
deregulated from 1998 onward.  Under the final definition, privately-owned utilities in 
New York State would only be defined as deregulated from 1999 onwards.  Publicly-
owned utilities in New York State would be classified separately for the entire time 
period, under all definitions of deregulation.  For all of these categories (three definitions 
of deregulation and four definitions of customer class), we have examined electricity 
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prices using both real and nominal prices.  A map of deregulated states is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. TRENDS IN RETAIL ELECTRICITY PRICES 
 First, we will analyze electricity prices without correcting for other factors to 
gain some familiarity with the data.  Although we have only chosen to highlight a few 
graphs below, we have analyzed the information for all twelve combinations of customer 
classes and definitions of deregulation as noted in the previous section.  In general, 
patterns and results were similar. 
 Figure 2 shows nominal industrial electricity prices for the three institutional 
classes: deregulated privately-owned utilities, regulated privately-owned utilities, and 
publicly-owned utilities.  In this figure, the prices in each institutional class are averaged 
for utilities in the lower 48 states.  We are using our primary definition of deregulation 
for this, meaning that any privately-owned utility which belonged to an ISO with a 
functioning wholesale market in 2002 is considered deregulated for the purposes of this 
comparison.  As Figure 2 illustrates, only customers of deregulated utilities saw an 
appreciable change in energy prices over the time period.  In nominal terms, the rate 
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Figure 1.  Deregulated States as of 2002 
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increase for deregulated customers was over one cent per kilowatt-hour, while the rate 
increases for the two other categories were less than a third of that: 0.18 cents per 
kilowatt-hour for customers of regulated, privately-owned utilities and 0.27 cents per 
kilowatt-hour for customers of publicly-owned utilities.  (Figure 2 portrays industrial 
customer prices; the pattern is similar for all four customer classes.)  
Figure 3 illustrates the difference in prices between privately-owned deregulated 
and regulated utilities in terms of a price gap, which is defined as 
 
(Deregulated Prices – Regulated Prices)/(Regulated Prices) x 100   (1) 
 
 
Results for industrial prices are thus equivalent, at least in sign, to trends for the other 
consumer classes. The difference in electricity prices between deregulated and regulated 
utilities increased over the study period. 
 Figure 4 repeats the analysis done in Figure 3, but this time broken down by ISO 
and only for total prices – the average cost of electricity across all customer classes.  
Using this analysis, it becomes obvious that the different ISO’s have responded in 
different ways.  Figure 4 suggests that most of the gap increases in Figure 3 can probably 
be attributed to the massive jump in the California ISO gap, especially given the large 
size of the California market as well as the large increase in relative prices.  However, in 
Figure 4, New York and the states in the New England ISO followed the same general 
pattern, although the increase was not as pronounced as with California.  Also notice that 
although Texas ended the period with deregulated prices below regulated prices, the 
advantage declined over the period.  Like Figure 3, patterns for total consumer electricity 
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prices are similar for all definitions of deregulation and all customer classes.  
(Incidentally, in Figure 4, the regulated average is calculated over all states not in an ISO; 
the deregulated average price is defined for each ISO.)  With the exception of California 
and New York, deflated prices declined for all customers for all types of utilities, but at 
different rates.  In California and New York, only residential customers saw a reduction 
in the real cost of electricity between 1990 and 2003. 
 It appears as though deregulation may not have succeeded in its aim of lower 
prices through the efficiencies generated by competition.  However, there may be other 
important factors determining this pattern.  Several are addressed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES DEFINED 
 We have examined a number of explanatory variables to attempt to explain the 
differing prices of electricity between states and regulation class.  Climate variables are 
the first possible explanation for price differences, as unusually hot or cold years could 
cause a high level of demand, and thus impact generating costs and prices.  To examine 
this effect, we have created the delta degree day variables, defined as the actual number 
of heating or cooling degree days in a given year less the mean number in each state.   
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Figure 2. Nominal Industrial Electricity Prices and GDP Deflator 
 
 
Figure 3. Price Gap for Privately-Owned Deregulated and Regulated Utilities 
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Figure 4. Price Gaps for Total Electricity Prices, Privately-Owned Deregulated and 
Regulated Utilities, by ISO 
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Also for each state, we have calculated the amount of electricity generated by six 
types of power plants: coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, hydropower, and other renewables.  
We expect states with more low-cost generating capacity to have lower retail prices.  For 
example, coal, hydropower, and nuclear generation all generally have much lower 
marginal costs than natural gas generation or electricity from other renewable sources.  
However, high capital costs for generating plants may result in higher retail prices 
through “stranded cost recovery.”  For instance, California utilities estimated their 
stranded costs to be between 21 and 25 billion dollars (Michaels 1997), to be paid by 
consumers through transition charges on electricity bills. 
Of course, fuel costs matter as well as generation mix.  We have also included 
average annual fuel costs per million BTU (MBTU) for coal, petroleum and natural gas.  
We expect that an increase in any of these prices will cause the price of electricity to 
increase.  Our fuel data has problems because some of our data is missing and must be 
replaced with hopefully appropriate data from nearby states.  In total, some price data for 
eighteen states is missing.  In some cases, we are only missing data for a single year for a 
single type of fuel.  For example, there is no data for the cost of natural gas in North 
Carolina in 1990.  In other cases, we may be missing data on all fuel costs in a state for a 
given year or missing all the data on one fuel type, in the case of coal prices for 
California.  California uses coal generation, but it is produced in other states.  If a state is 
part of an ISO, we have used the average of the rest of the states in the ISO to fill in the 
missing fuel costs.  If not, or the state is the only state in an ISO, we used data from 
nearby states which appear to have similar fuel costs.  For full details, see the attached 
appendix A. 
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For all of the explanatory variables discussed so far, gap variables have also been 
constructed in a manner similar to electricity price gaps.  In this case, the equation is: 
 
(Deregulated Utility Value – Average Value for Regulated Utilities)/(Average 
Value for Regulated Utilities) x 100   (2) 
 
 
Finally, we have constant terms for deregulation status.  Each ISO is assigned a 
constant term, and there is a different term for regulated privately-owned utilities.  Thus, 
we have six constant terms relating to regulation status: privately-owned regulated utility, 
California ISO, PJM Interconnect, Energy Reliability Council of Texas, New England 
ISO, and New York ISO.  If deregulation has been effective at reducing retail electricity 
rates, the constant terms for ISO’s should have a negative or zero coefficients.  Publicly 
owned utilities are the default case because their prices are generally the lowest.  In our 
final regression, we also include terms for NERC regions, shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  NERC Regions in North America (NERC) 
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V. TRENDS IN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 Trends in our explanatory variables may explain the observed trends in electricity 
prices.  Some factors in the data account for increasing costs outside of the realm of 
deregulation.  For example, Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the difference in generation mix 
between regulated and deregulated states.  Deregulated states tend to use more natural gas 
and nuclear power and less coal and hydropower.  In general, hydropower is extremely 
cheap (and often controlled by publicly-owned utilities) so it is no surprise that states 
with ready supplies of hydropower can offer lower power rates. 
In fact, one of the main arguments in favor of deregulation was that it would 
allow states with an abundance of cheap electricity to sell electricity to states with higher 
rates (Van Doren and Taylor 2004).  Likewise, natural gas is usually more expensive than 
coal generation, and while nuclear power may be, in marginal terms, cheaper than fossil-
fuel power reactors, its capital costs can amount to significant sums.  
As Figure 8 demonstrates, fuel prices are often higher in deregulated states.  In the 
New England states, for instance, they were sometimes over sixty cents per million BTU 
higher.  The only reason that California coal costs are so close to the average coal costs 
for regulated states may be that California coal generation occurs in the four corners 
states and Arizona coal costs were used.  Natural gas prices are more constant across the 
different regulation categories, although there are large spikes for New England in 1992 
and California in 2001. 
Now that the basic trends in the explanatory variables and the electricity prices 
are understood, we can move on to our preliminary regression results. 
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Figure 6.  Fuel Sources in Regulated and Deregulated States: Hydropower and 
Nuclear Generation 
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Figure 8.  Comparison of Coal Costs for ISO’s and Regulated States 
MBTU are “Million British Thermal Units” 
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VI. RESULTS FROM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 In section III, we found that rates (defined in real dollars) declined over the time 
period for most customers,1 although that decline was less in deregulated states.  In this 
section, we seek to understand how this pattern has been influenced by variations in fuel 
prices, types of generation, and climate.  A variety of econometric models were used to 
test these effects, but break down into three broad classes.  In the initial set of analyses, 
explained and summarized in Tables 1-4, we use customer prices as the dependent 
variables, and also compare results according to estimation method.  The explanatory 
variables include climate, generation mix, fuel prices and constant terms for deregulation 
status. 
 The second set of analyses (Tables 5-12) all use price gaps (as defined in 
Equations (1) – (3)) as dependent variables, and are all undertaken with the GARCH 
method to correct for possible problems arising from heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  Two price gap definitions are used: a deregulated/regulated gap, and a 
private/public gap.  Additionally, each is modeled using both non-gap and gap 
explanatory variables. 
 In the final set of analyses (Tables 13 – 15), customer prices are again used as 
dependent variables (as in Tables 1-4).  However, to the list of explanatory variables we 
add constant terms for NERC region, generation ratios and proportionality-weighted fuel 
prices.  The final two explanatory variables replace fuel prices and generation mix in the 
regression.  Finally, Table 15 summarizes the coefficients of the ISO constant terms 
across different definitions of deregulation. 
                                                 
1 The exception: in New York and California, industrial and commercial rates (in real dollars) increased for 
customers of private utilities. 
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A) Electricity Prices vs. Climate, Generation Mix, Fuel Prices, Deregulation Status 
Table 1 shows the results from a typical OLS regression, while Table 2 shows the 
results from a typical GARCH regression; both regressions (as well as all other 
typical regression results that follow) use nominal industrial electricity prices (or 
industrial electricity price gaps, in the case of the gap models) as the dependent 
variable.  Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results from the 24 regressions performed for 
the OLS and GARCH model respectively.  These 24 regressions include all possible 
permutations of deregulation definition, customer type, as well as real and nominal 
prices. 
 Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 show similar results for most explanatory 
variables.  However, two of the delta heating and cooling degree day2 coefficients are 
reversed in sign from our expectations.  The delta cooling degree day coefficient is 
negative in the OLS model; in the GARCH model, the delta heating degree day 
coefficient is negative.  In both cases, we would expect all degree day variables to be 
positive.  We also expect all the fuel price coefficients to be positive, but the 
coefficient for coal price is negative under the GARCH model.  But, with the 
exception of other renewable sources, the ranking of the generation coefficients 
seems to agree with our expectations.  Taken together, they confirm that coal and 
hydropower provide the cheapest power sources, while nuclear, petroleum, natural 
gas and other renewable sources have increasingly positive impacts on customer 
rates.  Finally, most of the deregulation status constant terms are unchanged between 
the two regressions.  The coefficients for California, New England and New York are 
                                                 
2 Delta degree days are defined as the actual number of heating or cooling degree days in a state for a given 
year minus the mean number of heating or cooling degree days for that state. 
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higher, while the coefficients for PJM and ERCOT are insignificant, close to zero, or 
negative. 
 Tables 3 and 4 mostly confirm this analysis.  Some of the variables which give 
unexpected results for nominal industrial electricity prices are insignificant in most 
regressions, such as the delta heating and cooling degree day variables in the GARCH 
model, summarized in Table 4.  The patterns discussed above for relative generation 
cost and deregulation status remain intact.  CAISO and NYISO are significant and 
positive in every regression; NEISO is positive and significant in all but two, while 
the results ERCOT and PJM are more often negative and insignificant.  As a last note, 
because the GARCH term is not significant in this model, it has been dropped from 
future regressions which correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation; we will 
now be using ARCH estimation. 
 B) Electricity Prices Gaps vs. Gap and Non-Gap Explanatory Variables 
 Tables 5 through 12 show the results from four different gap regressions.  The 
model summarized in Table 5 uses the price gap between deregulated and regulated 
industrial electricity prices as a dependent variable (as defined in Equation (1)) with a 
wide range of gap explanatory variables (as defined in Equation (2)): heating and 
cooling degree day gaps, fuel prices gaps, and generation gaps with constant terms for 
deregulation status.  The model behind Table 6 has the same dependent variable, but 
the explanatory variables are expressed in their original units, as in the models 
summarized in section (A).  Tables 9 and 10 repeat this analysis, but use the gap 
between private and public utilities as the dependent and gap explanatory variables.  
The equation used to generate gap variables for this model is: 
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(Privately-Owned Utility Value – Average Value for Public Utilities)/(Average Value 
for Public Utilities) x 100   (3) 
 
As with Tables 5 and 6, the model summarized in Table 9 uses gap explanatory variables 
and that in Table 10 uses the variables in their original units. 
 Tables 7, 8, 11 and 12 summarize the results from twelve gap regressions for the 
previous models, again utilizing all combinations of customer classes and definitions of 
deregulation.  With a gap model, there are only twelve permutations instead of 24 
because the price gap is the same whether prices are expressed in nominal or real terms.  
As a whole, these results suggest that gap explanatory variables explain price differences 
between different regulation or ownership classes much better than the raw values for 
deregulated state or private-owned utilities.  Price differences cannot be easily explained 
by any of these models, though customers of privately-owned utilities in many 
deregulated states have significantly higher retail costs of electricity than customers of 
publicly-owned utilities.  For instance, Table 11 shows this price gap is higher for 
customers of every ISO except ERCOT. 
 C) Electricity Prices vs. Climate, Fuel Ratios, Proportionality-Weighted Fuel 
Prices, Deregulation Status, NERC Region 
 The final regression model examines generation ratios instead of generation in its 
natural units, to separate scale and generation mix effects.  Like the first model, it uses 
electricity prices as the dependent variable, for four customer classes and both nominal 
and real prices: 
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Pe = HDD + CDD + TG + DER + NERC + ∑ (wiPi + wi )   (4) 
 
HDD and CDD are heating and cooling degree days, respectively.  TG, the total 
generation of each state, is used to quantify scale effects.  The constant terms DER and 
NERC are used to indicate the deregulation status of a state and to which NERC region(s) 
it belongs.  Fuel costs are included for coal, oil and natural gas as the product of fuel 
costs and generation ratio for that fuel type – the proportionality weighted fuel price.  The 
sum of these terms represents the average fossil fuel cost per million BTU for a state.  
Finally, the generation ratios for all major sources of power are included.  Because these 
ratios sum to one for each state, the intercept is excluded to avoid problems with 
multicollinearity.  Table 13 illustrates results from one regression, while Table 14 
summarizes results for all 24 regressions.  This model explains variations in electricity 
prices very well.  The climate variables still behave differently than expected, but are not 
significant very often.  Also, the coal cost ratio is the only fuel cost variable effective at 
explaining differences in electricity prices.  However, almost all of the generation ratios 
are significant in every regression and suggest that coal and hydropower provide the 
cheapest electricity, while oil, nuclear, natural gas and other renewable sources are 
increasingly more expensive.  It is interesting to note that, despite its low marginal costs, 
states which rely heavily on nuclear power see higher prices of electricity than those 
relying heavily on coal.  This may be partially explained by the issue of stranded cost 
recovery.  The negative coefficient on total generation suggests the findings of Fraquelli 
et al. hold for the United States: there are economies of scale in the electric power 
 29
industry.  The price effect from ISO’s follows a familiar pattern: CAISO, NEISO and 
NYISO all have positive coefficients, while coefficients of ERCOT and PJM are close to 
zero of negative.  
 Finally, Tables 15 examines the coefficients of the constant terms for deregulation 
status across our three definitions of deregulation.  For example, the entry is the 
“CAISO” row under column “1” is the average value of the coefficient from equation (3) 
from eight regressions, across all customer classes and real and nominal prices.  With the 
exception of PJM, all the coefficients are positive.  Except for Texas under definition two 
and California, all the coefficients are also greater than the Private Regulated coefficient 
in each definition.  However, only 39 out of 60 coefficients from which these averages 
are generated are significant at the 5% level.  Although the results in Table 15 are 
complex, they do not support a conclusion that in aggregate deregulation has lowered 
electricity rates relative to those rates in still-regulated states. 
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Table 1. Nominal Industrial Electricity Prices: Typical Regression Results, OLS3 
Adjusted R2: 0.42 
Observations: 1177 
Variables Coefficients T Statistic 
Intercept 6.21 13.25
Delta Heating Degree Days 1.21E-04 1.12
Delta Cooling Degree Days -2.56E-04 -2.47
Nominal Coal Price per MBTU 5.18E-03 4.14
Nominal Natural Gas Price per MBTU 1.94E-04 1.02
Nominal Oil Price per MBTU 9.78E-04 3.09
Coal Generation -1.64E-08 -11.33
Hydropower Generation -4.69E-08 -13.61
Natural Gas Generation 7.19E-09 3.53
Nuclear Generation 1.31E-08 4.82
Other Renewables Generation 7.19E-08 4.59
Petroleum Generation 3.47E-08 4.34
Private Regulated -0.46 -5.09
CAISO 2.71 6.47
PJM 0.52 2.42
ERCOT -0.97 -2.33
NEISO 2.76 15.37
NYISO 1.42 3.39
                                                 
3 Although data on electricity prices are available for 1990-2003, data on some of the explanatory variables 
are not.  Thus, this regression is only for the years 1990-2002. 
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Table 2. Nominal Industrial Electricity Prices: Typical Regression Results, 
Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Total R2: 0.88 
Observations: 1177 
Variables Coefficients T Statistic 
Intercept 5.23 48.35
Delta Heating Degree Days -2.10E-05  -0.84
Delta Cooling Degree Days 1.29E-04   2.86
Nominal Coal Price per MBTU -5.07E-04  -3.38
Nominal Natural Gas Price per MBTU 1.50E-04   3.64
Nominal Oil Price per MBTU 2.59E-04   4.85
Coal Generation -5.85E-09  -9.44
Hydropower Generation -3.71E-08 -20.76
Natural Gas Generation 7.93E-09    5.30
Nuclear Generation 4.44E-09 2.82
Other Renewables Generation -2.52E-08 -1.63
Petroleum Generation 3.29E-09 0.79
Private Regulated -0.59 -21.02
CAISO 5.08 13.26
PJM -1.36 -14.17
ERCOT -0.97 -2.73
NEISO 1.79 36.68
NYISO 4.10 9.64
AR(1)4 -0.91 -181.4
ARCH(0) 0.12 35.00
ARCH(1) 1.33 31.92
GARCH(1) 1.08E-18 0.00
 
                                                 
4 These coefficients represent ω (AR), α (ARCH), and γ (GARCH) in the following GARCH model: 
yt = xt’β + νt 
νt = εt – ςνt-1… 
εt = √(htet) 
ht = ω + Σ αi(εt-i)2 + Σ γjht-j 
As a whole, the ARCH and GARCH models correct for heteroscedasticity by modeling the variance of the 
error terms as the sum of a constant, a term which relates to the previous error terms and a term which 
relates to the pervious variances of the error term.  The “AR(1)” term is the initial constant term.  The 
“ARCH(0)” and “ARCH(1)” terms are the coefficients on the effect of the current and previous period’s 
error term on the variance of the current period’s error term.  Finally, the “GARCH(1)” is the coefficient 
for the effect of last year’s variance of the error term on the current variance of the error term.  In Table 2, 
the significant coefficients for AR(1), ARCH(0) and ARCH(1) indicate that the error terms have been 
corrected by a process which corrects for time-dependent error terms.  The low t-statistic for the 
GARCH(1) coefficient indicates that last year’s error variance does not significantly affect the variance 
estimate for the current year.  For more information see Pindyck and Rubinfeld, pp. 285-292. 
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Table 3. A Meta-Summary of 24 Regressions, OLS 
Variable Average Coefficient Number of Regressions 
Significant at 5% Level 
Intercept 6.78 24
Delta Heating Degree Days -1.10E-04 12
Delta Cooling Degree Days -9.76E-04 24
Coal Price Per MBTU* 1.07E-02 24
Natural Gas Price Per MBTU* -2.10E-04 0
Oil Price Per MBTU* 6.68E-04 5
Coal Generation -2.04E-08 24
Hydropower Generation -4.60E-08 24
Natural Gas Generation 1.29E-08 24
Nuclear Generation 2.12E-08 24
Other Renewables Generation 4.63E-08 12
Petroleum Generation 4.32E-08 24
Private Regulated 2.11E-01 17
CAISO 3.64 24
PJM 7.03E-01 10
ERCOT -4.23E-01 2
NEISO 2.92 24
NYISO 3.72 20
* These are treated the same with regards to inflation as the dependent variable.  If the 
electricity cost variable is given in real terms, so are these. 
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Table 4. A Meta-Summary of 24 Regressions, Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation 
Variable Average 
Coefficient 
Number of Regressions With 
Significant Coefficient at 5% 
Level 
Intercept 6.00 24
Delta Heating Degree Days -4.28E-05 1
Delta Cooling Degree Days -1.61E-05 8
Coal Price Per MBTU* 2.50E-03 21
Natural Gas Price Per MBTU* 4.56E-05 7
Oil Price Per MBTU* 4.78E-04 21
Coal Generation -1.21E-08 23
Hydropower Generation -2.25E-08 24
Natural Gas Generation 8.91E-09 19
Nuclear Generation 6.34E-09 15
Other Renewables Generation 2.42E-08 13
Petroleum Generation 1.42E-08 17
Private Regulated -0.28 23
CAISO 3.93 24
PJM -0.83 17
ERCOT -0.56 7
NEISO 1.39 22
NYISO 3.84 24
AR(1) -0.84 24
ARCH(0) 0.14 24
ARCH(1) 1.19 24
GARCH(1) 0.29 16
* These are treated the same with regards to inflation as the dependent variable.  If the 
electricity cost variable is given in real terms, so are these. 
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Table 5. Deregulated/Regulated Industrial Electricity Price Gaps with Gap 
Explanatory Variables: Typical Regression Results, Corrected for 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Adjusted R2: 0.95 
Observations: 169 
Variables Coefficients T Statistic 
Heating Degree Day Gap 1.16 31.63
Cooling Degree Day Gap -0.03 -0.25
Coal Price per MBTU Gap -0.74 -1.02
Natural Gas Price per MBTU Gap -0.14 -0.33
Oil Price per MBTU Gap 0.78 1.26
Coal Generation Gap -0.91 -1.79
Hydropower Generation Gap -0.29 -0.57
Natural Gas Generation Gap 0.02 0.31
Nuclear Generation Gap 0.48 1.67
Other Renewables Generation Gap -0.15 -0.93
Petroleum Generation Gap 0.09 1.49
CAISO 370.61 0.99
PJM -41.73 -0.52
ERCOT 106.40 0.44
NEISO -16.93 -0.23
NYISO -74.57 -0.34
AR1 0.02 0.07
AR2 -7.63E-03 -0.02
ARCH0 11035.00 9.03
ARCH1 0.00 0
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Table 6. Deregulated/Regulated Industrial Electricity Price Gaps with Non-Gap 
Explanatory Variables: Typical Regression Results, Corrected for 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Adjusted R2: 0.27 
Observations: 169 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
HDD 0.02 3.92 
CDD -0.20 -0.63 
Real Coal Price -0.49 -0.39 
Real NG Price -0.10 -0.14 
Real Oil Price 0.38 0.54 
Coal Generation -6.46E-06 -1.00 
Hydropower Generation -2.53E-06 -0.03 
Natural Gas Generation 4.97E-07 0.09 
Nuclear Generation 6.32E-06 0.98 
Other Renewables Generation -2.50E-05 -0.38 
Petroleum Generation 3.03E-05 2.17 
CAISO 508.36 0.25 
PJM 287.29 0.43 
ERCOT 1015.00 3.92 
NEISO 81.4492 0.12 
NYISO -259.29 -0.11 
AR1 -0.19 1.10 
AR2 0.17 0.68 
ARCH0 160652.00 1335.96 
ARCH1 1.12E-23 0.00 
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Table 7.  A Meta-Summary of 12 Deregulated/Regulated Gap Regressions with Gap 
Explanatory Variables, Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
 
Variables Average 
Coefficient 
Number of Regressions With 
Significant Coefficient at 5% Level 
Heating Degree Day Gap 1.03 12
Cooling Degree Day Gap 0.09 7
Coal Price per MBTU Gap -0.25 0
Natural Gas Price per MBTU Gap -0.03 0
Oil Price per MBTU Gap 0.49 1
Coal Generation Gap -0.45 4
Hydropower Generation Gap -0.08 0
Natural Gas Generation Gap 0.03 3
Nuclear Generation Gap 0.21 0
Other Renewables Generation Gap -0.01 0
Petroleum Generation Gap 0.05 8
CAISO 92.16 0
PJM -5.13 0
ERCOT 38.24 0
NEISO -1.97 0
NYISO -36.08 0
AR1 0.2 0
AR2 -0.04 0
ARCH0 5226.08 12
ARCH1 2.26E-23 0
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 Table 8.  A Meta-Summary of 12 Deregulated/Regulated Gap Regressions with 
Non-Gap Explanatory Variables, Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation 
 
Variables Average Coefficient Number of Regressions 
With Significant Coefficient 
at 5% Level 
HDD 0.01 0
CDD 0.02 0
Real Coal Price 0.12 0
Real NG Price -0.12 0
Real Oil Price 0.20 0
Coal Generation -4.2E-06 0
Hydropower Generation -3.9E-06 0
Natural Gas Generation 1.28E-07 0
Nuclear Generation 4.56E-06 0
Other Renewables Generation -7.50E-06 0
Petroleum Generation 1.90E-05 10
CAISO 101.86 0
PJM 45.23 0
ERCOT 234.72 4
NEISO 42.15 0
NYISO -243.28 4
AR1 0.18 0
AR2 -.17 0
ARCH0 134271.90 12
ARCH1 -3.60E-24 0
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Table 9. Private/Public Industrial Electricity Price Gaps with Gap Explanatory 
Variables: Typical Regression Results, Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation 
Adjusted R2: 0.89 
Observations: 582 
Variables Coefficients T Statistic 
Intercept -22.25 -6.46
Heating Degree Day Gap -0.04 -2.41
Cooling Degree Day Gap 0.02 1.39
Coal Price per MBTU Gap -0.11 -5.16
Natural Gas Price per MBTU Gap 0.08 6.13
Oil Price per MBTU Gap -0.01 -4.15
Coal Generation Gap -0.05 -4.67
Hydropower Generation Gap -0.02 -7.21
Natural Gas Generation Gap 0.02 3.08
Nuclear Generation Gap 0.01 2.13
Other Renewables Generation Gap -0.04 -4.45
Petroleum Generation Gap 4.80E-03 1.98
CAISO 140.91 9.60
PJM 13.61 2.94
ERCOT 21.91 1.84
NEISO 69.34 15.00
NYISO -0.23 -0.03
AR1 -0.88 -31.49
AR2 -0.02 -0.80
ARCH0 39.67 16.32
ARCH1 1.26 9.45
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Table 10. Private/Public Industrial Electricity Price Gaps with Non-Gap 
Explanatory Variables: Typical Regression Results, Corrected for 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Adjusted R2: 0.90 
Observations: 582 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
Intercept -6.25 -0.50 
HDD -4.90E-04 -0.55 
CDD 1.39E-03 0.61 
Real Coal Price -0.02 -0.59 
Real NG Price 2.85E-03 1.06 
Real Oil Price 4.84E-04 0.08 
Coal Generation -1.33E-07 -3.39 
Hydropower Generation -2.16E-07 -2.74 
Natural Gas Generation 3.43E-07 3.92 
Nuclear Generation 1.66E-07 2.07 
Other Renewables Generation -2.60E-06 -2.67 
Petroleum Generation 1.22E-07 0.57 
CAISO 121.85 5.05 
PJM 15.90 1.88 
ERCOT -22.52 -1.25 
NEISO 63.57 7.00 
NYISO 7.67 0.53 
AR1 -0.82 -12.46 
AR2 -0.06 -0.94 
ARCH0 103.69 15.53 
ARCH1 0.42 4.06 
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Table 11.  A Meta-Summary of 12 Private/Public Gap Regressions with Gap 
Explanatory Variables, Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
 
Variables Average 
Coefficient 
Number of Regressions With 
Significant Coefficient at 5% Level 
Intercept -9.65 7
Heating Degree Day Gap -0.02 3
Cooling Degree Day Gap 2.50E-03 2
Coal Price per MBTU Gap -0.07 8
Natural Gas Price per MBTU Gap 0.04 9
Oil Price per MBTU Gap -0.01 10
Coal Generation Gap -0.06 8
Hydropower Generation Gap -9.17E-03 4
Natural Gas Generation Gap 0.01 5
Nuclear Generation Gap 0.02 7
Other Renewables Generation Gap 2.80 6
Petroleum Generation Gap 3.64E-03 6
CAISO 46.11 8
PJM 9.17 8
ERCOT -1.17 0
NEISO 49.56 11
NYISO 28.56 9
AR1 -0.74 12
AR2 -0.09 8
ARCH0 131.77 12
ARCH1 1.23 12
 
 41
 Table 12.  A Meta-Summary of 12 Private/Public Gap Regressions with Non-Gap 
Explanatory Variables, Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
 
Variables Average Coefficient Number of Regressions 
With Significant Coefficient 
at 5% Level 
Intercept -21.65 0
HDD 1.57E-03 0
CDD -2.66E-03 0
Real Coal Price 0.17 8
Real NG Price 8.57E-04 0
Real Oil Price -6.59E-03 0
Coal Generation -2.1E-07 7
Hydropower Generation -1.8E-07 3
Natural Gas Generation 1.94E-07 1
Nuclear Generation 2.12E-07 1
Other Renewables Generation 3.20E-07 4
Petroleum Generation 3.94E-07 0
CAISO 46.65 4
PJM 2.40 0
ERCOT -3.56 0
NEISO 20.42 4
NYISO 14.85 1
AR1 -0.84 12
AR2 0.08 6
ARCH0 294.30 12
ARCH1 0.42 12
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Table 13.  Nominal Industrial Electricity Prices, with NERC Regions: Typical 
Regression Results, Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Adjusted R2: 0.96 
Observations: 1177 
Variable Coefficient T-Stat 
HDD -3.80E-05 -1.29
CDD -4.50E-04 -6.35
Coal Cost Ratio 2.40E-03 1.92
NG Cost Ratio 5.86E-04 0.71
Oil Cost Ratio 1.51E-03 0.63
Coal Ratio 5.10 15.04
Hydropower Ratio 4.35 14.56
NG Ratio 9.18 25.07
Nuclear Ratio 8.28 30.46
Other Renewables Ratio 7.82 10.22
Oil Ratio 6.35 6.22
Private Regulated -0.39 -5.80
CAISO 0.54 1.27
ERCOT (ISO) -0.48 -0.94
NEISO 0.86 7.80
NYISO 0.27 0.74
PJM -1.00 -8.16
Total Generation -1.76E-10 -0.23
ECAR -0.15 -0.92
ERCOT (All Utilities) -0.40 -0.82
FRCC 0.98 3.12
MAAC -0.22 -1.09
MAIN -0.98 -7.65
MRO 0.44 3.32
NPCC 0.15 0.92
SERC -1.04 -7.08
SPP -0.87 -8.50
WECC -0.60 -4.36
AR1 -0.07 -1.96
ARCH0 0.48 10.97
ARCH1 0.79 8.21
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Table 14.  A Meta-Summary of 24 Regressions with NERC Region, Corrected for 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
 
Variable Average 
Coefficient 
Number of Regressions With Significant 
Coefficient at 5% Level 
HDD 6.16E-05 2
CDD -1.52E-04 9
Coal Cost Ratio 1.03E-02 13
NG Cost Ratio -3.22E-04 2
Oil Cost Ratio 9.79E-04 2
Coal Ratio 4.16 22
Hydropower Ratio 5.92 24
NG Ratio 8.70 24
Nuclear Ratio 8.59 24
Other Renewables Ratio 11.28 24
Oil Ratio 6.96 14
Private Regulated 0.19 10
CAISO 2.33 17
ERCOT (ISO) 0.20 0
NEISO 0.74 6
NYISO 3.11 8
PJM -0.59 8
Total Generation -1.99E-09 4
ECAR 0.48 4
ERCOT (All Utilities) -0.38 1
FRCC 0.95 9
MAAC 0.39 3
MAIN -1.02 14
MRO 0.33 8
NPCC 0.14 6
SERC -1.27 20
SPP -0.11 9
WECC -0.60 8
AR1 -0.13 15
ARCH0 2.83 23
ARCH1 0.44 9
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Table 15.  Meta Summary of Coefficients For ISO Constant Terms For Three 
Definitions of Deregulation; Eight Regressions for Each Definition5 
ISO/Definition 1 Number 
Significant 
at 5% 
2 Number 
Significant 
at 5% 
3 Number 
Significant 
at 5% 
CAISO 2.20 4 2.24 6 2.56 7 
ERCOT 0.24 0 0.09 0 0.27 0 
NEISO 0.95 4 0.69 2 0.57 0 
NYISO 3.60 4 2.91 2 2.82 2 
PJM -0.46 2 -0.66 3 -0.65 3 
Private 
Regulated 
0.08 4 0.23 3 0.24 3 
                                                 
5 In the first definition, a state which was in an ISO with an operating auction-based 
market at the wholesale level in 2002 is considered a deregulated state for the entire time 
period.  Under definition two, a state is considered deregulated for those years beginning 
with its admission to an ISO which has an auction-based market by the end of the period, 
2002.  For the third and final definition, a state is only considered deregulated for those 
years in which an active auction-based wholesale market functions in its ISO. 
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VII. SUMMARY 
 Overall, our research shows that there is no evidence to support the general 
expectation that deregulation would result in lower electricity prices.  Most of our results, 
regardless of analysis method, showed that even though most customers in deregulated 
states saw declines in the real price of electricity, they faced higher prices relative to 
customers in still-regulated states.  Furthermore, these price differences remain even after 
controlling for climate, generation mix, fuel prices and NERC region, as shown by the 
coefficients to the constant terms from the regressions discussed in Section VI. 
 An important area for future research would be involve investigating wholesale 
costs of power, as well as the differences between retail and wholesale prices.  For 
deregulated states, we can look at the auction-clearing prices in the individual ISO, but no 
such market mechanism exists in still-regulated states.  As a proxy, we might use 
generating costs for regulated states, but those are not immediately comparable to 
auction-clearing prices, as the latter would probably include some form of profit or risk 
premium. 
 We have examined price differences as affected by climate variables, fuel mix, 
fuel cost and ISO effects.  We have used three definitions of regulatory status, four 
customer class groupings, and both real and nominal prices.  We do not find empirical 
support for a generalized expectation that customers in deregulated states experienced 
lower rates than customers in still-regulated states. 
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Appendix A: Fuel Cost Data Substitutions  
State Fuel Years Replacement 
California Coal 1990-2002 Arizona 
California Oil 1995-1997 Arizona 
Connecticut All 2000-2002 Average NEISO 
Delaware Coal 2002 Average PJM 
Idaho All 1990,1991,1993-2002 Nevada 
Massachusetts Coal 2001 Average NEISO 
Maryland All 2001-2002 Average PJM 
Maine Coal,NG 1990,1991,1993-2002 Average NEISO 
Maine Oil 2000-2002 Average NEISO 
Montana Oil 2000-2001 Wyoming 
North Carolina NG 1990 South Carolina 
New Hampshire NG 1990,1991,1996,1998 Average NEISO 
New Jersey NG 2002 Average PJM 
Oregon NG 1990 Oregon 
Oregon Oil 1996 Oregon 
Pennsylvania NG 2002 Average PJM 
Rhode Island Coal 1990,1991,1993-2002 Average NEISO 
Rhode Island NG 1999-2002 Average NEISO 
Rhode Island Oil 1997-2002 Average NEISO 
South Dakota NG 1990,1997,1999-2002 Minnesota 
South Dakota Oil 1994,1995,1997-2002 Minnesota 
Tennessee NG 1990,1991,1993-2002 Kentucky 
Vermont All 1990 Average NEISO 
Vermont Oil 1990,1991,1999,2001,2002 Average NEISO 
Washington NG 1990,1999-2002 Nevada 
Washington All 2001,2002 Nevada 
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